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Citizenship, Voting, and Asian American 
Political Engagement 
Ana Henderson* 
A significant issue for Asian American’s civic engagement and 
political empowerment is access to the ballot and to electoral schemes that 
allow Asian Pacific Islander American (API) voters to elect 
representatives of their choice. Because voting in nearly all U.S. 
jurisdictions is limited to citizens, questions about Asian American voters’ 
citizenship—both real and imagined—can impact electoral access in ways 
that decrease electoral strength and participation. This Symposium Article 
will focus on two contemporary areas where citizenship issues may affect 
API voter access and electoral success: (1) new state laws requiring 
verification of citizenship for registration and voting and (2) data 
requirements for Voting Rights Act (VRA) compliance in electoral 
districts. In the citizenship verification context, API voters may face 
additional challenges to registering to vote and casting a ballot, both 
because of disparate rates of citizenship compared to other groups as well 
as election worker and poll watchers’ suspicions about voters’ citizenship 
and therefore eligibility to cast a ballot. In the VRA context, case law 
requiring that voters of color seeking to dismantle at-large election systems 
that dilute their voting strength use citizenship data to state a prima facie 
claim of discrimination may make it impossible for API voters in many 
areas to pursue VRA remedies to discriminatory electoral systems. 
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INTRODUCTION: THE INTIMATE RELATIONSHIP  
BETWEEN VOTING AND CITIZENSHIP 
Voting in the United States is an important right, not just because, as the 
U.S. Supreme Court has recognized, it is “preservative of all rights,”1 but also 
because access to the vote is a key expression of citizenship and a symbol of 
national membership. National membership validates that an individual is entitled 
to the full benefit of legal rights and protections as well as public goods and 
services. Access to the ballot box has been contentious since the country’s 
founding, leaving various portions of the populace without political voice—and 
outside the circle of authentic citizens—throughout U.S. history and even today. 
At the country’s founding, despite appeals to equality in our founding 
documents, whole populations were excluded from the franchise due to their race, 
ethnicity, gender, or economic status. Voting was limited to white, land-owning 
males,2 and representation in the U.S. House of Representatives was apportioned 
with racial stratification (excluding all Indians not taxed and counting the slave 
(black) population as only three-fifths of its actual size).3 In the antebellum period, 
when voting was generally open to free males, free black men were often denied 
their right to vote, even in the North.4 Voting rights were denied to American 
Indians who paid taxes and had abandoned their tribal affiliation,5 but granted to 
Mexican Americans, at least formally, who through treaty were declared to be 
white.6 
Even after the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution prohibited denying 
the right to vote on the basis of race or color, voting rights were regularly denied 
to citizens of color.7 States adopted laws that limited access to the franchise 
 
1. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964); see also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 
(1886). 
2. See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF 
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (2009). 
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. 
4. See, e.g., Hobbs v. Fogg, 6 Watts 553, 560 (Pa. 1837); see also A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., 
SHADES OF FREEDOM 170–72 (1996). 
5. See, e.g., Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 109 (1884). 
6. See People v. de la Guerra, 40 Cal. 311, 338–39 (1866). 
7. Immediately after the Civil War and passage of the Fifteenth Amendment, black 
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through a variety of means including voter registration requirements, literacy tests, 
poll taxes, English-only elections, and more, which were often applied in a 
discriminatory manner. API voters were affected by state and national policies. 
Some states overtly excluded certain groups. For example, California’s 1879 
Constitution prohibited “natives of China” from voting, despite the Fifteenth 
Amendment’s passage just nine years earlier.8 Many Asian Americans who were 
immigrants were disenfranchised by citizenship requirements for voting, which 
states started adopting in the late nineteenth century.9 Since naturalization was 
limited to whites and those of African descent at the time,10 immigrants from 
Asian countries were largely prohibited from becoming naturalized citizens.11 
Accordingly, being “alien[s] ineligible to citizenship,”12 Asian immigrants could 
not participate in elections when the right to vote was restricted to citizens. 
This disenfranchisement continued until the civil rights movement of the 
mid-twentieth century. New laws and aggressive enforcement cajoled several 
states into removing bars to the franchise. Revisions to immigration and 
 
registration, participation, and representation skyrocketed to levels not seen since through a 
combination of federal protection and intensive black mobilization. However, state governments 
soon began to restrict black voting rights by instituting a variety of new eligibility and registration 
requirements, which were often waived for whites. Coupled with violent retribution against blacks 
who sought to exercise their voting rights and withdrawal of federal protections, these state laws had 
a devastating effect: within thirty years, blacks in the South were forced out of the political system. See 
RICHARD M. VALELLY, THE TWO RECONSTRUCTIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK ENFRANCHISE-
MENT 128 (2004). Latinos were similarly disenfranchised by eligibility requirements, such as English 
language abilities, as well as extralegal efforts to disenfranchise them. See MORGAN KOUSSER, 
COLORBLIND JUSTICE: MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS AND THE UNDOING OF THE SECOND RECON-
STRUCTION 69–70 (1999). Native Americans were regularly disenfranchised, even into the 1950s, by 
state constitutions that refused to grant them the vote. See, e.g., WE THE PEOPLE, http://research 
.history.org/pf/weThePeople (last visited Jan. 13, 2013) (noting that New Mexico was last to grant 
suffrage to Native Americans in state elections in 1962). 
8. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 1 (1879). This section also designated that only male citizens could 
vote and further stated that “no native of China, no idiot, insane person, or person convicted of any 
infamous crime, and no person hereafter convicted of the embezzlement or misappropriation of 
public money” possessed the right of suffrage. Id. 
9. See KEYSSAR, supra note 2, at 315–19 tbl.A.4. 
10. See MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF 
AMERICA 38 (2004). 
11. See IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 31 
(2006). 
12. See Natsu Taylor Saito, Alien and Non-Alien Alike: Citizenship, “Foreignness,” and Racial 
Hierarchy in American Law, 76 OR. L. REV. 261, 271 n.36 (1997) (noting that the origins of the term 
“alien ineligible to citizenship” came from several state and federal laws in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries that made distinctions on an individual immigrant’s ability to naturalize or 
lack thereof); see, e.g., The California Alien Land Law of 1913, 1913 Cal. Stat. 40–41. At the time, 
naturalization was restricted to whites and individuals of African descent. Through a series of cases 
regarding naturalization, which Ian Haney López has called “the prerequisite cases,” the courts 
deemed Asian immigrants as ineligible to naturalize since they were not white (and not of African 
descent); see HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 11 passim. By drafting laws prohibiting land ownership, for 
example, by aliens ineligible to citizenship, states were able to legislate against Asian immigrants 
without overtly naming race or national origin. See NGAI, supra note 10, at 39–40. 
1080 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:1077 
 
naturalization laws opened Asian immigration to the United States as well as 
removed bars to Asian immigrant naturalization.13 The Voting Rights Act of 1965 
and substantial federal attention and enforcement helped open the political system 
to black citizens again. The 1975 amendments to the VRA extended its 
protections to certain language minorities—Asian, Native American/Alaska 
Native, and Spanish heritage.14 In the process, it banned discrimination and 
required certain jurisdictions to provide election related information in languages 
other than English, opening up the electoral process for meaningful participation 
by limited English proficient Asian American, Native American, and Latino 
citizens.15 
While the VRA and other federal provisions, coupled with vigorous 
enforcement by federal officials as well as private parties, expanded formal 
membership in the electorate to more groups than ever, they did not throw the 
circle of membership open to all. Today, laws remain on the books in several 
states that exclude various classes of individuals: citizens who have been convicted 
of a felony,16 citizens who are not registered to vote,17 and/or citizens who have 
been deemed mentally incompetent, among others. Moreover, in nearly all 
jurisdictions, access to the ballot is limited to U.S. citizens, although in the past 
non-citizens were allowed to vote in many elections.18 
 
13. Immigration of Asian nationals had been severely restricted, and in some cases barred, for 
many years. The change in immigration policies removed these race-based restrictions. For a 
discussion of exclusion of Asians from immigration and naturalization, see generally NGAI, supra note 
10. 
14. The 1975 amendments also included non-English language assistance requirements, 
allowing the meaningful participation of limited English proficient citizens. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1a 
(2006). 
15. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973. In addition, the Twenty-Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, in 
turn, banned poll taxes, eradicating another mode of disenfranchisement. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV. 
16. These “felon disenfranchisement” laws vary from state to state. In the most extreme, 
individuals convicted of a felony lose their right to vote for life; in other states, civil rights may be 
restored. See Map of Felony Disenfranchisement Laws Around the Country, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, 
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/map_felony_disenfranchisement_laws_around_co
untry (last visited Jan. 13, 2013); see also THE SENTENCING PROJECT, http://www.sentencingproject 
.org/template/page.cfm?id=133 (last visited Jan. 13, 2013). 
17. Nearly all states limit voting to registered voters, and most states require voters to register 
up to thirty days before an election in order to cast a ballot. See National Mail Voter Registration Form, 
U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N (Mar. 1, 2006), http://www.eac.gov/assets/1/Page/National 
%20Mail%20Voter%20Registration%20Form%20-%20English.pdf. The waiting period between 
registration and voting used to be significantly longer, barring many new arrivals from participation, 
ostensibly because individuals needed more time living in a jurisdiction before they could make 
intelligent decisions about its government. The thirty-day maximum waiting period was established in 
the NVRA. 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1(d). 
18. This was not always the case. Earlier in U.S. history, non-citizen residents were permitted 
to vote in many states and territories. See KEYSSAR, supra note 2, at 315–19 tbl.A.4; Jamin B. Raskin, 
Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical, Constitutional and Theoretical Meanings of Alien Suffrage, 141 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1391, 1397 (1993) (citing Leon E. Aylsworth, The Passing of Alien Suffrage, 25 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 114, 114 (1931)). 
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I. MODERN DAY PREOCCUPATION WITH CITIZENSHIP IN VOTING 
The issue of citizenship and voting has become increasingly contentious in 
recent years, with laws, policies, legal opinions, and public debate focusing on 
whether and how non-citizens can or should be involved with U.S. elections. In 
the registration context, we see a push to verify that citizens—and only citizens—
register to vote in the form of new requirements and questioning of citizenship 
status, even of already registered voters. In the Voting Rights Act districting 
context, we see data requirements that attempt to limit any potential influence or 
“counting” of non-citizens in districting decisions. Both of these issues may affect 
API participation and representation. 
A. Citizenship Verification in Voter Registration 
As noted above, U.S. citizenship is a requirement for voting in nearly all 
jurisdictions and elections in the United States. During much of the late twentieth 
century, citizens “proved” their citizenship eligibility19 by affirming or swearing to 
it, under penalty of perjury. In 1993, the National Voter Registration Act 
(NVRA),20 streamlined the registration process for federal elections to increase 
voter access and participation, requiring the creation of voter registration forms 
that could be submitted by mail and directing the states to provide opportunities 
to register to vote when individuals obtained driver’s licenses or other social 
services provided by the state.21 The federally mandated forms provide a space for 
registrants to swear they are citizens, eighteen or over, and otherwise eligible to 
vote.22 
In 2004, this began to change. Instead of accepting a sworn statement as to 
citizenship, states started requiring more—verification of citizenship status. In a 
growing number of states and among some pundits, an individual’s word and the 
penalty of perjury were no longer sufficient to ensure that aliens did not gain 
access to the ballot. Voter rolls and authentic citizens had to be protected from 
non-citizen infiltration.23 As of December 2013, five states had passed laws,24 and 
 
19. Other criteria such as age and residency were also “proven” through attestation. 
20. While the NVRA places a variety of restrictions and requirements on states’ voter 
registration practices, it is most well known for the “motor voter” provisions. Indeed, it is often 
referred to as the “motor voter law,” thanks to a provision requiring states to offer individuals the 
ability to register to vote when applying for a driver’s license. The NVRA also requires states to 
provide the opportunity to register to vote at social services offices, mandates the acceptance of a 
federal registration form, and places certain requirements on states regarding the maintenance of their 
voter registration rolls. This includes requirements that they maintain accurate rolls and prohibits the 
purging of voters within ninety days of an election. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. § 1973gg-3(c)(2)(C). 
23. See infra notes 56–58 and accompanying text. 
24. States that had adopted citizenship verification requirements for voter registration 
included Arizona, Georgia, Kansas, Alabama and West Virginia. See Ana Henderson, Web Special: 
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several other states had recently considered legislation, requiring some kind of 
citizenship verification in order to register to vote.25 These citizenship verification 
laws fall into two general categories: (1) verification through documentary proof 
of citizenship and (2) verification by database cross-reference. In addition, in the 
run up to the 2012 elections, some states instituted administrative actions to verify 
voter citizenship. State administrative action included cross-referencing voter rolls 
and other databases to determine citizenship status with the ultimate goal of 
purging them from voter rolls. 
1. State Laws Requiring Documentary Proof of Citizenship in Order to Register 
Three states have passed, and several others have considered, laws requiring 
applicants to present documentary proof of citizenship in order to register to vote. 
These laws signal a departure from the prior practice of accepting a sworn 
statement of citizenship as sufficient proof of citizenship to register to vote. Each 
of the laws adopted thus far apply only to new registrants, so voters who are 
currently registered do not need to prove their citizenship. 
The first citizenship verification law was Arizona’s Proposition 200 in 2004. 
Proposition 200, known as the “Protect Arizona Now” initiative, was a ballot 
initiative approved by Arizona voters that addressed a variety of citizenship based 
issues. Among other things, Proposition 200 required documentary proof of 
citizenship in order to register to vote.26 Proposition 200 revised Arizona election 
 
Citizenship Verification, Obstacle to Voter Registration and Participation, URBAN HABITAT, http://urban 
habitat.org/19-1/henderson (last visited Nov. 1, 2013). 
25. Citizenship verification for voter registration was a particularly hot issue in the states 
during 2012, with at least seven states considering legislation that would add additional citizenship 
requirements to the right to register to vote. Seventeen states introduced such legislation in 2012: 
Alabama, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New 
Hampshire, Nevada, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and Washington. See 
Election 2012: Voting Laws Roundup, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Oct. 11, 2012), http://www 
.brennancenter.org/analysis/election-2012-voting-laws-roundup#_edn2. In August 2012, seven states 
were actively considering numerous pieces of legislation on this issue: California, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, South Carolina, Missouri, Michigan, and Virginia. H.B. 2109, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. 
Sess. (Mo. 2011), available at http://www.house.mo.gov/billtracking/bills121/sumpdf/HB2109I.pdf; 
H.B. 515, 162nd Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2011), available at http://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/ 
legislation/2012/HB0515.html; Assemb. B. 2497, 2011–2012 State Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012), 
available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/asm/ab_2451-2500/ab_2479_bill_20120224 
_introduced.pdf; H.B. 569, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2012), available at http://lis.virginia 
.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?121+ful+HB569H1+pdf; H.B. 194, 187th Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 
2011), available at https://malegislature.gov/Bills/187/House/H194); S.B. 304, 119th Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(S.C. 2011), available at http://www.scstatehouse.gov/sess119_2011-2012/bills/304.htm; H.B. 828, 
2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2012), available at http://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?121 
+ful+HB828+pdf; H.B. 895, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2012), available at http://lis.virginia 
.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?121+ful+HB895+pdf; H.B. 5221, 2011–12 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mi. 2011), 
available at http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2011-2012/billintroduced/House/pdf/2011 
-HIB-5221.pdf. In Virginia, three bills were pending. H.B. 569, supra; H.B. 828, supra; H.B. 895, supra. 
26. It also required identification in order to cast a ballot, proof of eligibility for non-federal 
public benefits, and that local officials report suspected undocumented immigrants to federal officials. 
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law to require that county registrars reject any application for registration that did 
not contain or come accompanied with acceptable proof of citizenship. Accepted 
documents include an Arizona driver’s license issued after 1996, a passport, a birth 
certificate, or naturalization papers.27 While a citizen could register by mail and 
provide a copy of a passport or birth certificate, naturalized citizens using their 
naturalization papers were required to present original documents in person for 
inspection at their county registrar’s office, and an individual supplying only a 
naturalization number would not be registered until the number is verified with 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).28 
In 2011, the Kansas legislature passed the Kansas Secure and Fair Elections 
Act, which required photo identification at the polls starting January 1, 2012 and 
proof of citizenship to register to vote starting January 1, 2013.29 The Kansas law 
designates the following as proof of citizenship: a U.S. passport, a birth certificate 
showing U.S. citizenship, a driver’s license from a state that requires citizenship 
for licensing, a Bureau of Indian Affairs identification card or number, and 
naturalization papers or numbers (but numbers must be verified with ICE before 
an applicant is added to the rolls).30 
In 2011, Alabama passed HB 56, the “Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen 
Protection Act.” HB 56 was arguably the strictest state immigration law in the 
nation and has garnered international attention and several lawsuits. However, the 
law’s voter registration provisions (section 29) garnered relatively little attention. 
Section 29 of the Act requires proof of citizenship prior to being added to the 
voter rolls. The law accepts the same documentation as Kansas.31 
 
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §16-166(F) (2010), preempted by Gonzalez v. Ariz., 677 F.3d 383 (9th Cir. 
2012) (holding that Arizona’s citizenship requirement was a violation of the NVRA since it places 
additional requirements on voters’ ability to register to vote beyond what the NVRA mandates). 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. In January 2012, Kansas’s secretary of state asked the legislature to move the 
implementation date of citizenship verification procedures up to June 1, 2012, so that it would be in 
effect for what Kansas secretary of state has called, “the spike in registrations” associated with the 
2012 presidential election. See John Hanna, Kansas Voter ID Laws: Kris Kobach, Kansas Secretary of State, 
Seeks Citizenship Proof, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 10, 2012 9:07 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost 
.com/2012/01/10/kansas-voter-id-laws-kris-kobach_n_1198172.html. Legislation to effectuate this 
request ultimately died in committee. See John Celock, Kris Kobach, Kansas Secretary of State, Defends Voter 
ID Law, HUFFINGTON POST (June 2, 2012 2:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/ 
02/kris-kobach-kansas-voter-id-law_n_1564740.html. 
30. Proof of U.S. Citizenship for Voter Registration, GOT VOTER ID?, http://www.gotvoterid 
.com/proof-of-citizenship.html#evidence (last visited Jan. 13, 2013). 
31. In Kansas and Alabama, the names and sex on the birth certificate much match that on 
the voter registration form. For some populations, such as married women, for example, there is 
likely to be an inconsistency between their birth certificate name and voter registration name, 
requiring them to take the additional step of completing a form explaining the reason for the 
inconsistency under penalty of perjury. Interestingly, while these laws allow a voter to attest to their 
identity, they disallow the attestation of citizenship. See ALA. CODE § 31-13-27(a)(5) (2011), declared 
unconstitutional by United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2012) (challenging portions of 
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2. State Laws Requiring Citizenship Verification by Cross-Reference 
Two states have addressed citizenship verification through legislation 
requiring cross-referencing with a citizenship database. Rather than require the 
voter to provide additional documentation or proof with his registration, these 
states cross-reference applicant information with other state databases to try to 
determine citizenship status. If questions about citizenship arise, the voter is 
provided an opportunity to prove her citizenship status. A voter who does not 
produce sufficient proof will not be permitted to register or remain registered to 
vote. 
In 2008, the Georgia legislature passed legislation requiring verification of 
registrants’ citizenship before they may be added to the voter rolls. Under the 
Georgia regime, registrants are cross-referenced with the state’s driver’s license 
database to determine citizenship. If an individual appears as a non-citizen in 
drivers’ records, her citizenship must be verified, either through documentation or 
communication with ICE, before her registration may be processed and she may 
be registered as a voter. Like the Arizona, Alabama, and Kansas laws, Georgia’s 
law only applies to new registrants. 
In 2011, Tennessee legislators passed a statute requiring that the state’s voter 
rolls be cross-referenced with other state and federal databases to identify 
potential non-citizens who are registered to vote.32 When cross-referencing raises 
a question about a voter’s citizenship status, county officials must send the voter a 
notice requiring him to produce proof of citizenship within thirty days or be 
removed from the voter rolls. Acceptable proof of citizenship includes a birth 
certificate, passport, naturalization papers, or other documentation accepted by 
the Immigration Control and Reform Act of 1986. Unlike Arizona, Kansas, and 
Georgia, Tennessee will apparently not limit citizenship verification to new 
registrations, but rather will check the citizenship of all registered voters. 
3. State Administrative Action on Citizenship Verification 
In addition to these statutes and constitutional provisions, in 2011 and into 
the summer of 2012, several states instituted administrative processes to attempt 
to identify and purge non-citizens who were registered to vote. Similar to the 
Tennessee law, officials in these states cross-referenced voter information with 
other state databases that might indicate citizenship status.33 In addition, some 
states requested access to the federal Systematic Alien Verification and 
 
the Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, 2011 Ala. Laws 535); K.S.A.  
§ 25-2309 (2012). 
32. S.B. 352, 107th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2011). 
33. In addition, in 2012 Michigan adopted administrative policies requiring voters to verify 
their citizenship at the polling place in order to receive a ballot. A federal court issued a preliminary 
injunction of the application of this requirement prior to the November 2012 Presidential Elections. 
See Bryanton v. Johnson, 902 F. Supp. 2d 983, 986 (E. D. Mich. 2012). 
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Entitlement (SAVE) database.34 The SAVE program, administered by the 
Department of Homeland Security, is a web-based “service that helps federal, 
state and local benefit-issuing agencies, institutions, and licensing agencies 
determine the immigration status of benefit applicants so only those entitled to 
benefits receive them.”35 States sought access to the SAVE database to check the 
citizenship status of registered voters. 
Registered voters identified as suspected non-citizens were to be informed of 
discrepancies and required to verify their citizenship or be removed from the 
voter rolls. Failure to prove citizenship could result in a voter being purged from 
voter rolls or subject to challenge in the polling place. Because these 
administrative processes were not public, complete information about them is not 
readily available for analysis. Press accounts and limited public statements from 
officials provide the bulk of information about these administrative processes. 
In Florida, the secretary of state instituted an administrative initiative to 
purge voter rolls of non-citizens. In spring 2011, Florida officials claimed that 
cross-referencing driver’s license and voter roll information revealed more than 
180,000 non-citizens were registered to vote.36 That initial figure was revised to 
approximately 2600 potential registered non-citizens.37 The state instructed county 
supervisors to contact identified voters requesting proof of citizenship and to 
purge those who did not comply. However, Florida’s actions made news when 
many county registrars refused to follow the state’s orders to question or purge 
 
34. According to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services: 
In 1986, Congress passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), 
which required the creation and implementation of a verification system that confirms 
immigration statuses of individuals applying for certain federally-funded benefits. This 
system originally came under the jurisdictional purview of legacy Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS). To successfully accommodate this federal mandate, legacy 
INS created the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) Program in 1987 
to develop the verification system. With the creation of the Department of Homeland 
Security in 2003, jurisdiction is now under the United States Citizenship and Immigration 
Services (USCIS), Verification Division. 
About the SAVE Program, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/ 
portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f614176543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=40fabff1bc0ca110Vgn
VCM1000004718190aRCRD&vgnextchannel=2af29c7755cb9010VgnVCM10000045f3d6a1RCRD 
(last visited Jan. 13, 2013). 
35. SAVE, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/portal/ 
site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=1721c2ec0c7c8110VgnVCM
1000004718190aRCRD&vgnextchannel=1721c2ec0c7c8110VgnVCM1000004718190aRCRD (last 
visited Jan. 13, 2013). 
36. Gary Fineout & Brendan Farrington, Fla. Voter-Roll Screening Yields Few Non-Citizens, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 12, 2012, 10:48 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/fla-voter-roll-
screening-yields-few-non-citizens. 
37. Michael C. Bender, Florida to Continue Hunt for Illegal Voters as Election Nears, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 17, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-09-17/florida-to 
-continue-hunt-for-illegal-voters-as-election-nears. 
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identified voters after more than five hundred voters on it turned out to be 
citizens.38 
As part of its administrative efforts, Florida requested access to the federal 
SAVE database for voter citizenship registration,39 and sued the United States 
Department of Homeland Security when access was not provided.40 Florida 
argued that federal records would allow it to verify citizenship of voters in 
question.41 In June 2012, the federal government granted Florida officials access 
to the SAVE database. After Florida cross-referenced the 2625 suspected non-
citizen voters with the SAVE database, it reported that its “Voter Eligibility 
Initiative” ultimately found 207 non-citizens on state voter rolls.42 The secretary of 
state proclaimed in its announcement that “The Voter Eligibility Initiative is 
already proving to be a successful process to identify illegally registered voters on 
Florida’s voter rolls.”43 
In Colorado, the secretary of state compared voter rolls with individuals who 
had used documents to obtain driver’s licenses that indicated they were not 
citizens, such as a U.S. Permanent Resident Card.44 Colorado officials initially 
estimated that 11,805 non-citizens might be registered statewide.45 The state 
eventually sent letters to 3903 suspected non-citizens46 notifying them to withdraw 
their registration voluntarily or prove their U.S. citizenship.47 Voters who did not 
 
38. See Fineout & Farrington, supra note 36. 
39. See Letter from Ken Detzner, Fla. Sec’y of State, to Janet Napolitano, Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t 
of Homeland Sec. (May 31, 2012), available at http://www.dos.state.fl.us/news/communications/ 
pressRelease/pdf/Letter_to_DHS_Secretary_Napolitano_5-31-2012.pdf .  
40. See Complaint, Fla. Dep’t of State v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (No. 1:12-cv-00960), 
available at http://www.dos.state.fl.us/news/communications/pressRelease/pdf/6-11-2012_DOS 
_vs_DHS_re_SAVE_Database.pdf. 
41. See Letter from Ken Detzner to Janet Napolitano, supra note 39. 
42. Press Release, Fla. Dep’t of State, Florida’s Voter Eligibility Initiative Confirms 207 Non-
Citizens on Voter Rolls Using SAVE Database, Around 8 Percent of Voters Checked (Sept. 12, 2012) 
[hereinafter Voter Eligibility Initiative], available at http://www.dos.state.fl.us/news/communications/ 
pressRelease/pressRelease.aspx?id=604; see also Bender, supra note 37. 
43. See Voter Eligibility Initiative, supra note 42. It is unknown how many voters were 
erroneously purged, perhaps for not affirmatively proving their citizenship or for not responding to 
requests for confirmation. However, the state settled a lawsuit challenging the citizenship purges, and 
agreed to reinstate voters and notify affected voters of their continued eligibility to vote. See Fineout 
& Farrington, supra note 36. 
44. Ivan Moreno, Colorado Voter Purge: Many Suspected Ineligible Voters Actually U.S. Citizens, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 29, 2012, 10:50 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/29/ 
colorado-voter-purge-list_n_1841731.html. 
45. Ivan Moreno, Republicans Look for Voter Fraud, Find Little, YAHOO! NEWS (Sept. 24, 2012, 
1:26 PM), http://news.yahoo.com/republicans-look-voter-fraud-little-172327169--election.html. 
46. Some have expressed concern that voters were targeted for partisan purposes. Ivan 
Moreno, Gessler Says 141 Illegally Registered to Vote, AURORA SENTINEL (Sept. 10, 2012, 7:37 AM), 
http://www.aurorasentinel.com/news/gessler-says-141-illegally-registered-to-vote (“In Colorado, the 
majority of the letters questioning citizenship went to Democrats, 1,566, and independents, 1,794. 
Gessler’s office said they didn’t look at party affiliation before sending the letters.”). 
47. Id. 
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respond would be purged from voter rolls and unable to vote. State officials 
received 482 responses affirming citizenship, and sixteen voluntary withdrawals of 
registration.48 
Subsequently, Colorado officials were able to cross-reference 1416 of the 
questionable registrants with the federal SAVE database. The SAVE database 
confirmed the U.S. citizenship status of all but 141.49 In September 2012, the 
secretary of state, citing limited time before the election to conduct eligibility 
hearings of these 141 individuals, stated that the only action he would take against 
them was to provide their names to county election officials for challenging as 
needed.50 
In 2011, New Mexico’s51 secretary of state cross-referenced voter rolls with 
driver’s license and other records to look for non-citizens registered to vote. As a 
result, she referred sixty-four thousand voter files to state police due to 
“irregularities.”52 She later reported that 117 “foreign nationals” had been 
identified on the voter rolls, and thirty-seven had voted.53 However, it was unclear 
whether those suspected of being non-citizens were in fact not citizens since the 
secretary of state refused to release information leading to their identification and 
because the list of “foreign nationals” upon which she relied apparently also 
contained citizens who had used an alternate form of identification to prove their 
identity when applying for a driver’s license.54 
Iowa’s secretary of state launched a similar effort in 2012.55 He instituted 
special emergency rules to implement a plan to check voter rolls for non-citizens, 
bypassing the normal rulemaking procedure as well as public comment.56 He 
claimed that cross-referencing with state transportation records revealed that 3582 
non-citizens were registered to vote.57 Iowa sought access to the SAVE database 
to run further investigation of these registered voters, but before gaining such 





51. Steve Terrell, Duran Joins Effort Asking Feds to Help Stop Voter Fraud, THE NEW MEXICAN 
(July 11, 2012), http://www.santafenewmexican.com/Local%20News/071212VOTERS. 
52. Michael Haederle, New Mexico Roiled by Voter Fraud Claims, L.A. TIMES, July 31, 2011, at 
A11, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jul/31/nation/la-na-voter-fraud-20110731. 
53. Id. 
54. Milan Simonich, ACLU Sues Secretary of State over Voter Registration, ALAMOGORDO DAILY 
NEWS (July 20, 2011, 1:11 PM), http://www.alamogordonews.com/ci_18514986. 
55. Jason Noble, Schultz Blames Feds for Delay in Removal of Ineligible Voters, THE DES MOINES 
REGISTER, Sept. 15, 2012, at 1B. 
56. Rod Boshart, Iowa Voting Rule Changes on Hold in Wake of Judge’s Ruling, Schultz Says, THE 
GAZETTE (Sept. 18, 2012, 2:00 PM), http://thegazette.com/2012/09/18/iowa-voting-rule-changes-
on-hold-in-wake-of-judges-ruling-schultz-says. 
57. Noble, supra note 55. This is out of 1,881,145 active and 2,114,408 total registered voters 
as of August 2012. Monthly Voter Registration Totals: August 2012, IOWA SEC’Y OF STATE 4, 
http://sos.iowa.gov/elections/pdf/VRStatsArchive/2012/CoAug12.pdf. 
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the basis that the emergency rulemaking had not been necessary.58 Moreover, the 
court found that concerns about voter eligibility could be sufficiently addressed by 
the voter challenge provisions in effect before the special rulemaking. 
Proponents of citizenship verification argue that it is necessary to safeguard 
the electoral process from fraudulent non-citizen voting and protect the votes of 
legal citizens. They argue that due to lax registration requirements in the NVRA, 
particularly the lack of any requirement to prove eligibility, non-citizens can and 
are registering to vote and even voting.59 Arguments for requiring proof of 
citizenship generally follow some incarnation of the following formula: (1) 
registering to vote is very easy, with no safeguards or requirements to prevent 
fraudulent registration; (2) there are many non-citizens in the country, including 
millions of “illegals”; (3) such non-citizens could register to vote if they lie about 
their citizenship and could then cast illegal ballots; and (4) several recent elections 
have been decided by small margins, so illegal non-citizen votes could affect 
electoral outcomes.60 Although some pundits admit “there is no reliable method 
to determine the number of non-citizens registered or actually voting,” they warn 
that “[t]housands of non-citizens are registered in some states, and tens if not 
hundreds of thousands may be present on the voter rolls nationwide.”61 
Given the fervor of advocacy for anti-fraud provisions and intensity of 
claims of non-citizen voting, one would expect ample evidence of widespread 
non-citizen participation. However, there is very little evidence of non-citizen 
voting fraud, that is non-citizens who intentionally register and vote despite 
knowing they are not eligible to do so. For example, an analysis of voting crime 
records in California between 1994 and 2006 found 161 complaints about non-
citizen registration.62 Of the 104 cases where state officials determined there was a 
criminal violation, 101 resulted in no action because the defendant lacked intent to 
commit fraud, and only two resulted in a criminal conviction or guilty plea.63 
 
58. Boshart, supra note 56. 
59. See Hearing on “You Don’t Need Papers to Vote?” Non-Citizen Voting and ID Requirements in U.S. 
Elections: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on H. Admin., 109th Cong. 118–23 (2006) (statement of Dan 
Stein, President, Fed’n for American Immigration Reform); HANS A. VON SPAKOVSKY, THE 
HERITAGE FOUND., THE THREAT OF NON-CITIZEN VOTING 8–9 (2008), available at http://www 
.heritage.org/Research/LegalIssues/lm28.cfm. 
60. VON SPAKOVSKY, supra note 59, at 1. 
61. Id. 
62. LORRAINE C. MINNITE, THE MYTH OF VOTER FRAUD 59–61 (2010). Similarly, an 
investigation of “illegal voting” in the 2004 gubernatorial election in Washington State found only two 
non-citizens, both university students, voted in the election, out of 2.9 million votes cast. See 
Stephanie Rice, Illegal Residents Could be Voting: Officials Say Most Noncitizens Wouldn’t Take Such a Risk, 
THE COLUMBIAN (Aug. 17, 2010, 6:00 AM), http://www.columbian.com/news/2010/aug/17/ 
illegal-residents-could-be-voting. The vast majority of the 1678 “illegal votes” were cast by felons. Id. 
63. MINNITE, supra note 62, at 59 tbl.4.2. 
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During this same period, more than seventy-five million votes were cast in 
California.64 
The administrative actions in Florida, New Mexico, and Colorado confirm 
that the incidence of non-citizen registration and voting is very small. In each 
state, initially large estimates of non-citizen voter registration were winnowed 
down to a very small fraction of registered voters, meaning the overwhelming 
majority of those originally identified were erroneously suspected of being non-
citizens. Colorado’s claimed 11,805 non-citizens resulted in only 141 remaining 
under suspicion (out of 3,491,088 registered voters),65 New Mexico’s 64,000 
irregularities reduced to 117 (out of 1,216,654 registered voters),66 and Florida’s 
original claim of over 180,000 registered non-citizens boiled down to just 207 (out 
of 11,483,461 registered voters).67 In addition, the ultimate numbers may be even 
smaller since some of these individuals turned out to be naturalized citizens whose 
records had not been updated.68 While non-citizens should not register to vote or 
vote in jurisdictions where they are not eligible, initial large claims of non-citizen 
registration as well as the large amount of resources dedicated to investigating 
voter rolls suggest to the media, election workers, and the public that non-citizens 
pose a threat to election security. 
B. Citizenship, Electoral Districts, and the Voting Rights Act 
In some Voting Rights Act cases dealing with electoral systems and districts, 
citizenship has also become an issue. The VRA prohibits, inter alia, electoral 
practices that have the purpose or effect of making the electoral process less open 
to some citizens than others based on race, color, or protected language minority 
status.69 It has been interpreted as prohibiting electoral schemes, such as at-large 
elections or districting plans, that do not provide minority voters with an 
opportunity to elect a representative of their choice.70 In these cases, both the 
remedy of choice, and the legal standard for making a prima facie case, focus on 
the ability to create one or more single-member districts in which the minority 
group in question forms a majority. 
The citizenship case law has also affected redistricting. A key requirement for 
 
64. Id. at 61. 
65. COLO. SEC’Y OF STATE, TOTAL VOTERS REGISTERED BY STATUS: AUGUST 2012, at 1, 2 
(2012), available at http://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/VoterRegNumbers/2012/August/Voter 
CountsByStatus.pdf. This is total registration. A smaller number (2,330,000) were active voters. Id. 
66. N.M. SEC’Y OF STATE, NEW MEXICO VOTER REGISTRATION STATISTICS REPORT BY 
JURISDICTION: AUGUST 2012, at 1 (2012), available at http://www.sos.state.nm.us/uploads/FileLinks/ 
2966cef424224c59b1abaf5b30a91116/STATEWIDEAUG312012.PDF. 
67. FLA. DIV. OF ELECTIONS, VOTER REGISTRATION MONTHLY REPORT: JULY 2012, at 1, 2 
(2012), available at http://election.dos.state.fl.us/voter-registration/archives/2012/July/Monthly.pdf. 
68. See Moreno, supra note 45. 
69. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006). Section 2 also prohibits purposeful discrimination on the basis of 
race, color, or protected language minority status in voting. Id. 
70. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 55–61 (1986). 
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jurisdictions that use election districts is that districts contain roughly the same 
number of people. Since the 1960s, jurisdictions have been required to redraw 
districts, usually subsequent to the release of decennial census data, to address 
inequalities in population and effectuate the goal of “one person, one vote.” The 
idea behind “one person, one vote” was that malapportioned districts—districts 
with unequal populations—led to inequities in voter power, with the votes of 
individuals in overpopulated districts diluted or carrying less weight compared 
with those of voters living in less populated districts. The U.S. Supreme Court 
found that such malapportioned districts violated Fourteenth Amendment’s equal 
protection guarantees.71 
In the context of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act,72 vote dilution refers to 
the ability to elect a representative of choice. That is, does the method of electing 
make it more difficult or impossible for minority voters to elect a representative of 
choice?73 An electoral system can dilute minority voting strength in a variety of 
ways. First, at-large election systems can submerge minority voting strength if the 
majority votes against minority interests. For example, API voters will have great 
difficulty mustering enough votes to elect a representative of choice to a city 
council in an at-large election if they constitute only forty percent of the 
population and the majority sixty percent always vote against their interests. 
Second, districting schemes that divide or “crack” minority populations into 
several districts rather than drawing them together into a district where they 
constitute the majority limit the ability to elect a representative of choice. For 
example, if a city’s API population were concentrated in one area and were large 
enough to be a majority in a single district, dividing it between two or more 
districts in which Asian Americans do not constitute a majority would “crack” the 
API vote. 
 
71. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); see also Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 
(1964)(holding that U.S. House of Representatives districts must have roughly equal populations 
pursuant to Article I, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution). 
72. No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure 
shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results 
in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on 
account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 
1973b(f )(2) of this title, as provided in subsection (b) . . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 1973(a). Although some jurists dispute that section 2 applies to electoral districts, see 
Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 26 (2009) (Thomas, J., dissenting), the Supreme Court has 
consistently applied it in cases challenging electoral systems and districts. See, e.g., id.; League of United 
Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006). 
73. A violation . . . is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown 
that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not 
equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) [race 
or language minority] in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the 
electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. . . . 
[N]othing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in 
numbers equal to their proportion in the population. 
42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (emphasis added). 
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Finally, districting schemes that over concentrate or “pack” a minority 
community in a way that reduces the number of districts in which they can elect a 
representative of choice. A packing scenario would include a city where Asian 
American voters could comprise a majority in two districts, but instead are 
“packed” into one district where they constitute a supermajority of the voters and 
perhaps others where they are less than the majority. These forms of minority 
vote dilution have been recognized to violate the Voting Rights Act, when certain 
other conditions exist.74 
Geographic and demographic distribution of populations has become a 
paramount concern in VRA litigation and redistricting discussions. In addition, 
since single-member electoral districts drawn with a majority of minority voters 
have proven a powerful tool to minority electoral success and political 
participation,75 the manner in which such districts are drawn and redrawn is a key 
consideration for minority voter empowerment. As a result, a key question in 
litigation to dismantle at-large systems of election or rectify districting systems that 
dilute minority voting strength, as well as in constructing redistricting plans to 
avoid violating the VRA, is the location and concentration of minority groups 
within a jurisdiction. 
The preoccupation with population distribution stems from the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s 1986 Thornburg v. Gingles76 opinion. The Court laid out a three-
part test that voters challenging multimember districts must prove in order to state 
a claim: (1) the minority population is sufficiently large and compact to constitute 
a majority in a single member district; (2) the minority group is politically cohesive 
in that they tend to vote the same in elections; and (3) the majority group tends to 
vote as a bloc against the interests of the minority group so that they usually are 
able to defeat candidates supported by the minority group. 
This three-part test has come to be known as the “Gingles preconditions,” 
and is a necessary first step in challenging an electoral scheme with an alleged 
 
74. Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 6. 
75. Some research also suggests a potential energizing effect on minority voter participation as 
well. The presence of a co-ethnic candidate tends to increase participation, e.g., the presence of an 
API candidate tends to correlate with increased voting among API voters. Accordingly, the 
construction of majority-minority districts where minority candidates are more likely to run for office 
can have collateral effects of increasing civic participation among traditionally disenfranchised 
communities that tend to vote at lower rates than non-Latino whites. See, e.g., Matt A. Barreto et al., 
The Mobilizing Effect of Majority-Minority Districts in Latino Turnout, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 65, 74 (2004). 
The reason that a minority group making such a challenge must show, as a threshold 
matter, that it is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a 
single-member district is this: Unless minority voters possess the potential to elect 
representatives in the absence of the challenged structure or practice, they cannot claim to 
have been injured by that structure or practice. 
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 n.17. 
76. Gingles dealt with a challenge to the 1982 North Carolina legislative redistricting plan that 
alleged that the plan “impaired black citizens’ ability to elect representatives of their choice.” See 
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 35. 
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dilutive effect under the VRA using a results test.77 In addition, the Gingles 
preconditions have become a litmus test for jurisdictions drawing district lines to 
determine whether they are in minimal compliance with the VRA since they set 
forth the minimum information needed for results test VRA litigation. 
The Gingles court did not specify whether the majority showing required in 
the first precondition referred to total population (POP), voting age population 
(VAP), or something else.78 Many early cases dealt with African American 
populations, and many lower courts rested on voting age population as the correct 
population of interest. That is, in order to satisfy the first Gingles precondition, 
African American plaintiffs had to demonstrate their voting age population was 
sufficiently large and compact to constitute a majority in a single member district. 
However, in section 2 litigation brought by Latinos, some defendant-
jurisdictions argued that majority-minority districts were impossible or not 
required because of the higher proportion of voting age Latinos who were not 
citizens. Rather than simply prove a potential single member district with a 
majority Latino POP or VAP to satisfy the first Gingles precondition, they argued 
that Latino plaintiffs should have to clear an additional hurdle—that its citizen 
voting age population (CVAP) was sufficient to constitute a majority of adult 
citizens in a potential district. 
To date, four U.S. courts of appeal have held that when citizenship rates 
differ for minority and majority populations, plaintiffs must take citizenship into 
account when trying to satisfy the first Gingles precondition. Due to the citizenship 
profile of major racial/ethnic groups in the United States, the CVAP requirement 
is likely to affect API populations.79 
 
77. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act prohibits practices enacted with a discriminatory 
purpose or intent as well as those that have a discriminatory result or disparate impact. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1973. The Gingles preconditions guide analysis in disparate impact cases, where a court is asked to 
determine whether an electoral scheme, such as at-large elections or districts, dilute minority voting 
strength, making it more difficult for voters of color to elect a representative of their choice. See 
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50. 
78. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50. In addition, the Gingles Court did not specify whether the first 
precondition had a numerical requirement. Did it mean a numerical majority, i.e., 50.01% or more? 
Or something else? Id. Twenty-three years after Gingles, the U.S. Supreme Court confronted this 
question in a case dealing with a district that was less than fifty percent black. Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 6. In 
Bartlett, a North Carolina county sued the state of North Carolina alleging that the state’s legislative 
redistricting violated a provision of the state constitution that legislative districts should refrain from 
splitting counties. Id. As a defense, the state argued that splitting counties was required to comply with 
the VRA. Id. A group of three judges stated that a minority group must be at least fifty percent of a 
district in order to satisfy the first Gingles precondition and trigger VRA protection. Id. at 19–20. This 
has generally been accepted as a new standard that litigants and line-drawing jurisdictions must satisfy 
when drawing electoral districts. See, e.g., Lowery v. Deal, 850 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1335 n.3 (S.D. Ga. 
2012) (quoting Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 19–20); Comm. for a Fair and Balanced Map v. Ill. State Bd. of 
Elections, 835 F. Supp. 2d 563, 581 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (quoting Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 19–20). 
79. In addition, Latinos are likely to be affected. Most API and Latino populations have 
higher rates of adult non-citizenship compared with non-Latino white, black, and Native American 
populations. See infra Chart 1. Note, however, that this is not true of all API or Latino subgroups. For 
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Ninth Circuit: The first circuit to confront this issue, the Ninth Circuit’s 
1989 opinion in Romero v. City of Pomona80 set the stage for future cases. In this 
challenge to the at-large method of electing the city council in the city of Pomona, 
California, the Court approved defining the Latino population in terms of 
citizenship, noting that Gingles “repeatedly makes reference to effective voting 
majorities, rather than raw population totals, as the touchstone for determining 
geographical compactness.”81 
Eleventh Circuit: In 1997, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals addressed 
the issue in a section 2 challenge by Latino voters concerning the at-large election 
of city commissioners in Miami Beach City, Florida.82 Plaintiffs presented 
evidence that three majority Latino districts could be drawn. However, the court 
found that when using citizenship data, rather than VAP or POP, the plaintiffs’ 
potential districts were not actually majority Latino and therefore did not satisfy 
the first Gingles precondition.83 
Fifth Circuit: Also in 1997, the Fifth Circuit ruled on “the relevance of 
citizenship to a vote dilution claim” in a challenge to Houston’s city council 
districting plan.84 The defendant city argued that, after taking disparate citizenship 
rates85 into account, Latinos were actually overrepresented on the council.86 The 
court agreed, finding that citizenship was a key consideration of section 2.87 
 
example, a higher proportion of Japanese Americans are born in the United States and therefore a 
higher proportion are citizens by birth compared to other Asian American population groups. See The 
Rise of Asian Americans, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (April 4, 2013), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/ 
2012/06/19/the-rise-of-asian-americans. 
80. Romero v. City of Pomona, 883 F.2d 1418 (9th Cir. 1989), overruled on other grounds by 
Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 914 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1990). On appeal, plaintiff black and 
Latino voters argued, among other things, that the district court erred by interpreting the first Gingles 
precondition as requiring a geographically compact majority of eligible voters rather than raw 
population, as the district court had found that after taking age and citizenship into account, neither 
blacks nor Hispanics could constitute a majority in a single-member district. Id. at 1421, 1425. The 
court also rejected a claim that black and Latino voters could be considered a single minority. See id. at 
1420–21. 
81. Romero, 883 F.2d at 1425. However, the court also notes that raw population figures were 
relevant for establishing whether a minority population was high enough, citing with approval cases 
that had required a total minority proportion of sixty-five percent or more to establish a voting 
population majority. See id. at 1425 n.13. 
82. Negrón v. City of Miami Beach, 113 F.3d 1563, 1565 (11th Cir. 1997). 
83. Id. at 1568–69. 
84. Campos v. City of Houston, 113 F.3d 544, 545, 547 (5th Cir. 1997). 
85. The court noted that 1990 census data showed that 45.8% of voting age Latinos, 2.2% of 
voting age non-Hispanic Anglos, and 1.6% of voting age non-Hispanic blacks were non-citizens and 
ineligible to vote. Id. at 547. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 548 (“[W]e decline to reject citizenship as a relevant factor in the Gingles analysis. 
The plain language of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act makes clear that its protections apply to 
United States citizens.”) Because only citizens of voting age can vote, the court stated that “[i]t would 
be a Pyrrhic victory for a court to create a single-member district in which a minority population 
dominant in the absolute, but not in voting age [citizen] numbers, continued to be defeated at the 
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Seventh Circuit: In 1998, the Seventh Circuit ruled on citizenship data in a 
section 2 challenged to Chicago’s 1982 aldermanic districting plan.88 Although the 
city’s plan appeared to underrepresent blacks and Latinos as a whole, the court 
found that after taking citizenship data into account, the plan underrepresented 
blacks by one district but overrepresented Latinos.89 Arguing that the VRA only 
protects citizens,90 the court determined that such dilution is outside the purview 
of the VRA. 
Most line-drawing bodies and lawyers assume that they must use CVAP 
numbers to determine VRA compliance, especially when dealing with API or 
Latino communities. API voters seeking to dismantle electoral systems that dilute 
their voting strength will have to work with CVAP data, which may pose 
challenges, as described further below. In addition, it may make it harder to draw 
majority–Asian American districts through redistricting processes. In the 2011 
round of redistricting, many jurisdictions, including jurisdictions outside the four 
circuits listed above, interpreted these cases as requiring that a majority-minority 
district be drawn only when a minority population’s citizen voting age population 
was greater than fifty percent. 
II. PRACTICAL IMPACTS: CHALLENGES FOR API VOTERS 
The CVAP and citizenship verification requirements discussed above are not 
merely academic curiosities. They pose potentially serious ramifications on Asian 
American political involvement and empowerment. Citizenship verification 
policies may make it difficult for Asian Americans to register to vote, and may cast 
doubt on Asian American voters who turn up on voter registration rolls and at the 
polls. CVAP requirements may make it harder for Asian Americans to challenge 
discriminatory electoral schemes and gain electoral representation. Since API 
citizens already register and vote at lower rates than other population groups,91 
 
polls.” Id. (quoting Brewer v. Ham, 876 F.2d 448, 452 (5th Cir. 1989)). 
88. Barnett v. City of Chicago, 141 F.3d 699, 701 (7th Cir. 1998). 
89. Id. at 705. In addition, the court engaged in a brief discussion of virtual representation 
(the idea that ineligible voters’ (children, non-citizens, etc.) interests can be protected/executed via 
voters), and found that such representational ideals were not within Congress’s mandate in the VRA. 
Id. at 704–05. Indeed, it found that “[n]either the census nor any other policy or practice suggests that 
Congress wants noncitizens to participate in the electoral system as fully as the concept of virtual 
representation would allow.” Id. at 704. 
90. Id. (“The right to vote is one of the badges of citizenship. The dignity and very concept of 
citizenship are diluted if noncitizens are allowed to vote either directly or by the conferral of 
additional voting power on citizens believed to have a community of interest with the noncitizens—
that being the very premise of the Latinos’ claim in this litigation.”). 
91. See Voting and Registration in the Election of November 2008 – Detailed Table 1: Reported Voting & 
Registration, by Sex and Single Years of Age: November 2008, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, available at http:// 
www.census.gov/hhes/www/socdemo/voting/publications/p20/2008/table02-1.xls (last visited Jan. 
13, 2013) [hereinafter Voting and Registration 2008]; Voting and Registration in the Election of November 2010, 
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/socdemo/voting/publications/p20/ 
2010/Table1_2010.xls (last visited Jan. 13, 2013) [hereinafter Voting and Registration 2010]. 
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requirements that may chill or hinder political participation or prospects are even 
more problematic. 
A. Citizenship Verification: Hurdle to Registration and Voting? 
As noted above, several states have adopted laws, constitutional provisions, 
and administrative policies that aim to ferret out and remove non-citizens from 
voting and registration. These actions do not impose a new citizenship 
requirement, since U.S. citizenship was already required in order to register and 
vote. Individuals seeking to register already had to swear under penalty of perjury 
that they were citizens, and all states had provisions to challenge and remove 
voters believed to be ineligible. Rather, these laws and policies constitute novel 
additional measures put in place to police registration rolls and access to the ballot. 
The laws and policies, as well as the arguments supporting them, suggest to the 
public that non-citizen registration and voting is a real threat to the integrity of 
U.S. elections. 
Laws and policies requiring citizenship verification in order to register or 
remain registered to vote are potentially harmful to API political engagement. 
First, due to registration disparities, citizenship verification laws may impose a 
greater burden on API citizens than others. Second, database and matching 
inaccuracies may lead to erroneous identification of API voters as non-citizens. 
Third, assumptions about foreignness may subject API voters to unwarranted 
challenges in registration and/or at the polls. 
1. Registration Disparities 
As noted above, citizenship verification laws such as those in Arizona, 
Georgia, Kansas, and Alabama apply only to new registrants and not existing 
voters. Since API citizens are registered at lower rates than other groups, laws that 
affect only new registrants will likely affect APIs at higher rates than other groups. 
Chart 1 shows the percentage of voting age citizens for various racial groups who 
reported being registered to vote in 2008 and 2010. API registration lags behind 
that of non-Latino whites and African Americans. Since these laws exempt 
currently registered individuals, fewer whites and African Americans will have to 
produce proof of citizenship than APIs. 
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Chart 1: Proportion of Citizens Reporting Voting and Registration by Race92 
 
Additional verification requirements for new registrants can have effects on 
political participation. First, since rates of participation are roughly equal between 
registered voters of different racial/ethnic groups, the registration gap is one of 
the principal causes of the participation gap. Laws and policies that make it harder 
to register to vote may help maintain the registration gap and therefore the 
participation gap. In addition, laws that place additional hurdles on new voters 
may dissuade them from entering the political process. The specter of having 
one’s citizenship challenged can intimidate potential voters, especially newly 
naturalized citizens or citizens with limited English proficiency. 
2. Database Problems 
The databases utilized raise serious concerns for API citizens seeking to 
vote.93 Citizenship and naturalization data in state and even federal databases is 
 
92. Voting and Registration 2008, supra note 91; Voting and Registration 2010, supra note 91. 
93. In addition to inaccuracies in government databases, the process of cross-referencing and 
matching datafiles can produce erroneous identifications. Voters may be erroneously matched with 
another individual’s information in a driver’s license file, for example. The personal information often 
used for matching, such as name and birthdate, is not as unique as one might think, so erroneous 
matches are possible. See, e.g., Justin Levitt & Michael McDonald, Seeing Double Voting: An Extension of 
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often outdated.94 Even if the matching is perfect, it is quite possible for someone 
who appears as a non-citizen in one government database to in fact be a citizen. 
Since databases often contain old information, they may not contain information 
about naturalization. This was apparently the case for several challenged voters in 
Florida and Colorado. These voters appeared as non-citizens in state and federal 
databases, but were actually newly naturalized citizens and fully eligible to vote.95 
Since more API adults are immigrants than other groups, they are more 
likely to appear in a government database about immigrants or to appear in a 
database with information indicating they are not citizens. For example, the 
federal SAVE database contains information about immigrants, and not 
information about native-born citizens. The same is true for state driver’s license 
databases that collect citizenship information. It appears from news reports that 
the New Mexico secretary of state used a separate database for individuals who 
used an “alternate identification” as the source of her “foreign national” voters.96 
3. Perceived “Foreignness” 
When citizenship becomes a contested issue and fears about non-citizens 
defrauding the electoral system abound, those perceived to be foreign are at higher 
risk of being targeted for enforcement. Due to a confluence of factors beyond the 
scope of this Article, concepts of who is “American” and who is “foreign” have 
been racialized, leading to assumptions that non-Latino whites are “American” 
while Asian Americans are “foreign.”97 The perceived foreignness of API 
individuals often bares no relation to their actual citizenship status, leading to what 
some call the “perpetual foreigner” status of Asian Americans.98 Particularly when 
foreignness is racialized, suggesting that phenotype or appearance (as well as other 
markers such as name, or accent) provide sufficient information to divine who is 
and is not a citizen, laws and policies directed at citizenship are most likely to 
affect individuals believed to be foreign.99 Citizenship verification for voter 
registration has been justified by claims that non-citizens threaten election 
integrity through illegal registration and voting. Although these laws appear to be 
 
94. In addition, databases contain errors, such as those caused by errors in data input. Because 
most voter registration forms are completed by hand and input into a database by hand, human error 
is a real risk in voter files. See, e.g., COMM. ON STATE VOTER REGISTRATION DATABASES, NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, STATE VOTER REGISTRATION DATABASES: IMMEDIATE ACTIONS AND 
FUTURE IMPROVEMENTS, INTERIM REPORT 41–44 (2008) (describing the various kinds of errors 
that can occur in the voter registration process that lead to errors in voter registration files). 
95. See Moreno, supra note 45. 
96. See Simonich, supra note 54. 
97. See, e.g., Saito, supra note 12; see also Claire Jean Kim, The Racial Triangulation of Asian 
Americans, 27 POL. & SOC’Y 105 (1999). For a more general discussion of race and national identity, 
see HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 11. 
98. See, e.g., ANGELO N. ANCHETA, RACE, RIGHTS, AND THE ASIAN AMERICAN EXPERI-
ENCE 62–65 (1998). 
99. See id. 
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neutral in that they target “non-citizens” and not any particular racial or national 
origin group, those perceived to be foreign are most likely to be subject to 
challenge. 
Experiences in past election cycles bare out that citizenship-based challenges 
are not uniformly and neutrally applied, but rather target individuals and groups 
believed to be foreign. In the 1999 elections in Hamtramck, Michigan, poll 
watchers selectively challenged certain voters on the basis of citizenship even 
though they did not have individualized evidence to support these challenges.100 
Poll watchers in the polls challenged voters who were Arab American, but did not 
challenge white voters.101 Challenges were based on dark skinned Arab appearance 
or having an Arab sounding name.102 Some challenged voters were made to take 
oaths of citizenship even though they presented U.S. passports.103 Moreover, one 
election official allegedly informed poll workers to require any voter who appeared 
to be Arab to present an identification card or voter registration card.104 White 
voters were not subject to challenges, were not made to take oaths of citizenship, 
and were not targeted for additional identification.105 
In the 2004 election cycle, one Georgia county registrar required voters with 
Latino surnames to appear in court to prove their citizenship and eligibility to 
vote.106 In 2005, an individual in Washington State challenged the citizenship 
eligibility of several voters who had registered to vote when they got their driver’s 
licenses, on the basis that they had names “that appear to be from outside the 
United States.”107 In the run up to the 2012 elections, organizers rallying poll 
watchers to challenge ineligible voters, including suspected non-citizens, justified 
their efforts with reports that busloads of people “who [do] not appear to be from 
this country”108 are brought in to vote. In these cases, names deemed to be 
“foreign” were the sole basis for accusing individuals of being non-citizens and 
illegally registered to vote. 
In a context where citizenship is challenged based on appearance or name, 
citizenship verification for voter registration laws may make it more difficult for 
API citizens to register and vote. The “perpetual foreigner” stereotype—that 
 
100. See Consent Decree, United States v. City of Hamtramck, No. 00-73541, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_2/hamtramck_cd.pdf. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. ¶ 8. 
103. Id. ¶ 10. 
104. See id. ¶ 16. 
105. Id. 
106. Complaint at 2, United States v. Long County, (No. CV206-040) (S.D. Ga. 2006). 
107. Jim Camden, Man Says Votes from Illegal Immigrants, THE SPOKESMAN-REVIEW (Spokane), 
Mar. 31, 2005, at B1, available at http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2005/mar/31/man-says-votes-
from-illegal-immigrants. 
108. Stephanie Saul, Looking, Very Closely, for Voter Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2012, at A1, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/17/us/politics/groups-like-true-the-vote-are-looking 
-very-closely-for-voter-fraud.html. 
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Asian Americans are foreign regardless of their actual citizenship—places API 
voters at higher risk for citizenship challenges. While proponents for citizenship 
verification laws might argue that these are race-blind policies that will affect all 
and counteract discrimination or stereotyping of certain groups, these laws also 
institute an atmosphere of suspicion among poll workers and poll watchers, and 
fear among voters. In the 1999 Hamtramck case discussed above, some Arab 
American citizens who heard about the citizenship challenges at the polls were too 
intimidated by the prospect of being challenged to go to the polls and attempt to 
vote. Laws and policies that make it harder for Asian Americans to register and 
vote pose an additional hurdle to Asian American civic engagement and 
representation. This is of particular concern since API registration and voting is 
already relatively low. 
B. Citizenship Data and Districting 
Citizenship data requirements may hinder API efforts to increase 
representation and dismantle discriminatory districts and electoral schemes. 
Requirements that API voters prove the possibility of a district that is over fifty 
percent API CVAP and/or that redistricting officials can only draw a district to 
help API empowerment if the API population is over fifty percent CVAP may 
disadvantage API communities, largely because of problems with the data they 
must use to make these determinations. 
As noted above, the principle data questions in Gingles and most other cases 
dealing with African Americans or Native Americans dealt with share of the total 
population and/or voting age population. These figures are easily derived from 
decennial census data.109 The census is an enumeration of the U.S. population 
conducted every ten years.110 While serious questions about undercounts exist, the 
census produces highly reliable data available at the smallest geographic units 
(census blocks) often needed for district drawing. 
The census asks about residency, birth date, gender, race, and Hispanic 
ethnicity. Age data can be derived from the birth date question to determine 
residents over age eighteen—voting age population. These data can be cross-
 
109. The census is an enumeration of the population to effectuate the requirements of Article 
I, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution. The census asks ten questions for each individual in a 
household. The Questions on the Form, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/2010census/ 
text/text-form.php (last visited Jan. 13, 2013). 
110. The census also provides the data used for reapportionment of U.S. House of 
Representative seats among the states as well as in the distribution of federal funds to local 
communities. Congressional Apportionment, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/prod/ 
cen2010/briefs/c2010br-08.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2013). The data used for redistricting are 
“apportionment data,” which differ from “resident data” also released from the census. 
Apportionment data include the resident population as well as U.S. residents and U.S. military and 
civilian government workers living abroad at the time of the census, less the population of the District 
of Columbia. Questions and Answers - 2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/2010 
census/about/answers.php (last visited Jan. 13, 2013). 
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referenced with the race or Hispanic question to derive VAP figures for each 
racial/ethnic group. These data allow line drawers, interested parties, litigators, 
courts, and others to draw districts that contain equal populations and to 
determine if and where the Voting Rights Act may require majority-minority 
districts to avoid diluting minority voting strength.111 However, the census does 
not ask about citizenship. 
The principle source of data for citizenship is a sample-based survey 
administered by the Census Bureau—the American Community Survey (ACS). 
The ACS asks many more social and economic questions than the decennial 
census, one of which pertains to citizenship. Cross-referencing age and citizenship 
data produce CVAP figures. Further cross-referencing with race/Hispanic data 
produces CVAP figures for various racial/ethnic groups. 
While the ACS is an excellent source of data for many uses, it is not an 
optimal data source for district drawing and VRA enforcement.112 Unlike the 
census, the ACS does not provide “counts” of the population; it provides 
estimates of the population.113 Because of sample size issues, ACS data are not 
available on the smallest geographical units used in redistricting. While the ACS is 
designed to provide reliable estimates using one year of data for areas with 
populations over sixty-five thousand, which includes all states and many counties, 
multiple years of data must be aggregated in order to obtain data for smaller 
areas.114 However, even aggregating five years of answers, the data are still not 
available at the census block level. This is problematic because district drawing 
often requires precise population calculations which can even go down to the 
census block level. 
 
111. In the redistricting context, these data are often referred to as “PL data” or “PL 94-171 
data” in reference to the federal law that requires the Census Bureau to provide them to the states for 
use in redistricting. This law also requires that tabulations of redistricting data be provided to the 
states within one year of the collection of the census. Act of Dec. 23, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-171, 89 
Stat. 1023. 
112. For a more in depth discussion of issues with the ACS and redistricting, see generally 
JORGE CHAPA ET AL., THE CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN INST. ON LAW AND SOC. POLICY, 
REDISTRICTING: ESTIMATING CITIZEN VOTING AGE POPULATION (2011), available at http://www 
.law.berkeley.edu/files/Redistricting_PolicyBrief4_forWeb.pdf. 
113. The ACS report estimates in the form of point estimates and margins of error, making 
the estimates area actually a range of values. Id. at 9. 
114. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, A COMPASS FOR UNDERSTANDING AND USING 
AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY DATA: WHAT RESEARCHERS NEED TO KNOW 3 (2009), available 
at http://www.census.gov/acs/www/Downloads/handbooks/ACSResearch.pdf. Three years of data 
are aggregated to produce estimates for places with populations greater than 20,000, and five years of 
data are aggregated to produce estimates for all units of geography down to the census block group 
level. Id. Five-year aggregated data are the only source available as close to the small levels of 
geography needed for drawing electoral districts. Id. at 7. However, where the population in a block 
group or other area is very small, the Census Bureau suppresses and does not release an estimate in 
order to protect individual respondents’ privacy. Id. at 8. For the 2011 round of redistricting, CVAP 
estimates came from the first release of five-year aggregated; this dataset included responses from 
surveys administered between 2005 and 2009. Id. at app.2, tbl.2. 
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More importantly for Asian American voters, the aggregation process may 
lead to data estimates that underestimate Asian American CVAP. Since five years 
of answers are combined, some of the data will be old. This is of particular 
concern for Asian Americans because it may lead to an underestimate of their 
citizen voting age populations. When the Census Bureau aggregates answers 
collected over five years, it does not “correct” the data for intervening changes, 
even for aging. Accordingly, an Asian American citizen who was thirteen years old 
at the beginning of the aggregation period still appears as a minor despite the 
passage of time. Since she is not included as being eighteen in the aggregated 
dataset, she does not count as an Asian American voting age citizen but rather as a 
minor despite her actual age of majority status. This is true for minor citizens of all 
groups, but is a key issue for Asian Americans, because the citizenship rate among 
minor APIs is significantly higher than that of adult APIs. A similar disparity does 
not exist between black, white, or Native American youths and adults. 
Accordingly, the coming of age of API minors will increase the citizenship 
rate of adult APIs as well as the proportion of adult citizens who are API. Chart 2 
shows the estimated citizenship rate among minors and adults for various groups 
in the Special Tabulation derived from the 2005–2009 aggregated ACS data. 
Because of the significant disparity in citizenship rates between Asian American 
minors and adults demonstrated in Chart 2, the aggregated data’s failure to “age 
up” minor API citizens can have profound and disparate results on their reported 
proportion of a given area, since there is not a corresponding disparity in 
citizenship rates between minor and adult non-Latino whites (or blacks or Native 
Americans). Especially when forced to comply with a fifty percent CVAP bright 
line requirement, this quirk in the ACS data can disenfranchise API voters since 
although their CVAP may actually be over fifty percent, the data do not yet reflect 
it. 
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Chart 2: Comparison of Citizenship Rates Among Minors and Adults by Race115 
 
Some have opined that the CVAP issue is not likely to have a significant 
effect on the voting rights of people of color.116 While it is true that the fifty 
percent threshold may not pose a significant obstacle to groups with large and 
highly concentrated populations or for groups with similar citizenship profiles to 
non-Latino whites, in some areas and for some groups, the fifty percent CVAP 
requirements coupled with ACS data issues may affect access to VRA protection. 
Asian Americans may fall short of VRA protection thresholds not because their 
citizen voting age population numbers are too low, but because they are unable to 
prove they reach at least fifty percent of a potential district given current data 
availability. This is particularly true for APIs in many areas of the country because 
their populations are relatively small. A small underestimate could make the 
difference in a successful VRA claim or a line-drawing body drawing districts that 
allow API voters to elect a representative of their choice. 
 
115. Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP) Special Tabulation from the 2005–2009 5-Year 
American Community Survey, U.S. Census Bureau,  http://www.census.gov/rdo/data/voting_age 
_population_by_citizenship_and_race_cvap.html (last visited Dec. 31, 2013). 
116. See, e.g., Nathaniel Persily, The Law of the Census: How to Count, What to Count, Whom to 
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Existing case law contains examples where CVAP data made a difference in 
VRA protection. For example, in the Miami Beach litigation discussed above, 
Latino plaintiffs were able to draw three of seven districts over fifty percent 
Latino VAP, but applying citizenship data made it impossible to draw a district 
over fifty percent Latino.117 Moreover, in a 2009 Texas lawsuit, the court rejected 
plaintiff’s claim, even though plaintiff provided a potential districting plan that 
included a district that was seventy-eight percent Latino population and seventy-
five percent Latino VAP, because it did not “prove” over fifty percent Latino 
CVAP.118 
The fifty percent bright line rule and CVAP requirements can also effect 
redistricting decisions. When a jurisdiction believes that only districts over fifty 
percent minority CVAP are required by the Voting Rights Act, it may decide that 
districts with high, but not over fifty percent minority, CVAP should not be 
drawn. This could be because they choose to prioritize other redistricting 
criteria,119 and do not feel bound to draw a less than fifty percent district; because 
they fear a plan will be invalidated as unconstitutional if they draw a high minority 
district that is not required;120 or because it wants to draw as few minority districts 
as possible, so will only draw those that are blatantly required by the case law. 
Regardless of the motive, the result is the same if line-drawing officials fail to 
draw a high minority district simply because it falls short of the fifty percent 
CVAP threshold. When CVAP data underestimate actual Asian American citizen 
voting age populations, the fifty percent bright line rule may have a 
disenfranchising effect. For example, in California’s 2011 state redistricting, the 
Citizen’s Redistricting Commission (CRC) drew a majority-API state assembly 
district. California’s AD 49, in the San Gabriel Valley, has an Asian American 
CVAP of 50.09%.121 To achieve this, the CRC divided a few cities between AD 49 
and other adjacent districts.122 The California Constitution advises against splitting 
cities if possible, but prioritizes VRA compliance over avoiding city splits. If it had 
not been possible to draw AD 49 with over fifty percent Asian CVAP, VRA 
coverage might not be triggered, leaving the CRC to weigh other redistricting 
 
117. Negrón v. City of Miami Beach, 113 F.3d 1563, 1567 (11th Cir. 1997). 
118. Reyes v. City of Farmers Branch, 586 F.3d 1019, 1021–22 (5th Cir. 2009). 
119. Other redistricting criteria may include incumbent protection, maintaining municipal or 
county boundaries, following natural landmarks, achieving compact districts, etc. See, e.g., CAL. 
CONST. art. XXI, § 2(d) (2010) (setting forth the criteria to be used to draw state legislative and U.S. 
House of Representative districts in California). 
120. The Supreme Court has prohibited the use of race as the sole or predominant factor in 
districting decisions. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993). 
121. See CALIFORNIA CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMM’N, FINAL REPORT ON 2011 
REDISTRICTING app.3, tbl.4 (2011) available at http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/downloads/meeting 
_handouts_082011/crc_20110815_5appendix_3.pdf . Note that the Asian VAP in AD 49 is 55.04%. 
See id. tbl.3. 
122. See id. app.4, available at http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/downloads/meeting_handouts 
_082011/crc_20110815_6appendix_4.pdf. 
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criteria, such as avoiding city splits. An underestimate of just a small number of 
Asian American voting age citizens can make a real difference in this kind of 
situation. 
CONCLUSION  
Citizenship and voting have a special relationship in the United States. In 
recent years, efforts have accelerated to ensure that voting and electoral 
representation is indeed limited to citizens only. Citizenship verification laws and 
policies affect who can gain access to and remain on voter rolls, which in turn 
determines who may cast a ballot and have a voice in our democracy. Citizenship 
data requirements limit district drawing efforts as well as Voting Rights Act 
challenges to electoral schemes due to weaknesses in the data that Asian 
Americans are forced to use. 
While on their face these measures make sense since voting is limited to 
citizens in nearly all U.S. jurisdictions, they have additional consequences that 
more harshly affect API citizens. Citizenship verification laws impose a new 
hurdle to voter registration, which disproportionately affect APIs, due to their 
lower voter registration rates, higher immigration rates (particularly among adults), 
and stereotype of perpetual foreignness. Citizenship data requirements make 
drawing districts that empower API communities as well as dismantling electoral 
systems that dilute API voting strength more difficult. Both citizenship 
verification and data requirements have the potential to impede API political 
participation and empowerment. This is particularly worrisome given API’s 
already generally low levels of voter registration and participation. 
Beyond the practical questions about potential effect on Asian American 
disenfranchisement, these measures pose larger questions about membership in 
U.S. society—who is a member and how can members be distinguished from non-
members in contemporary settings? Both policy decisions seek to limit voting and 
representation to citizens by excluding non-citizens, raising larger questions about 
who is a citizen and therefore worthy of representational participation. In the 
process of defining who members are not, the U.S. polis defines itself. In a nation 
undergoing demographic shifts with cultural and racial/ethnic overtones but 
where racially discriminatory means of identification are no longer acceptable, 
defining who is a member becomes simultaneously more logistically difficult and 
important to majority members. 
It remains to be seen whether the burgeoning preoccupation with citizenship 
in voting is a function of politics in a presidential election year or a more durable 
fixture of our political system in an era of demographic change. In the meantime, 
Asian American political empowerment may be hindered by citizenship 
preoccupations, adding novel challenges that must be overcome to achieve full 
political membership. 
  
